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Manufacturing and marketing the modem contracts casebook is
a formidable enterprise. Contemporary authors must envy the
nineteenth-century pioneers who had only to mine and collate enough
unedited case reports to permit a student to deduce the pure Idea of
Contract in Langdelian fashion.1 The gradual establishment of a
canon of cases permitted later authors to free-ride somewhat on their
predecessors' research,' but it correspondingly increased the costs of
product development and marketing. Offering largely the same
collection of cases, new market entrants had to develop innovations
such as note cases, "comments," "problems," and "materials" in order
to achieve product differentiation.3 Those novelties having themselves
become standardized, today's author must define an even more
specialized marketing niche by identifying some still unmet pedagogical
need or slighted theoretical perspective that will be supplied by the
new publication.' Yet a steady stream of excellent contracts casebooks
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1. See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the Anthology, 85
MICH. L. REv. 1406 (1987).
2. Farnsworth notes that many of the cases selected by the earliest casebook writers were
"reused in anthology after anthology" and were revered as "leading cases" that became part of the
"taught tradition of American contract law." Id. at 1437. He also notes that the anthologists
"often took cases from each other." Id. at 1438.
3. Farnsworth dates such developments from the 1940s. Id. at 1407.
4. A self-conscious example is the opening sentence of the Preface to the first edition of
ROBERT E. ScoTr & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW & THEORY (2d Ed. 1993): "The
best place to begin is with the toughest question any prospective reader is likely to ask: Why do
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continues to roll off the academic assembly lines.' One such work,
less well known 6 than some of its competitors, is Contract and Related
Obligation (CRO) 7 by Robert Summers and Robert Hillman. On the
occasion of the publication of its third edition, this casebook deserves
to be reintroduced' to the contracts teaching community.
A casebook's warranties appear in its preface.' In their Preface
to the First Edition, the authors of CRO undertook to do the follow-
ing: (1) acquaint the student with the lawyer's role in contractual
relations; (2) stress the "private-made" character of much of what we
call law; (3) expose students to many different theories about contract;
(4) renew the waning practice of "dialectical" teaching by using largely
unedited principal cases, and by eschewing summaries and textual
notes; (5) reveal the many extra-legal sources of law, including moral,
political, and economic reasoning; and (6) offer more general insights
as to the nature of law and lawyering.'0 While I believe CRO largely
succeeds in these aims, I will focus on its treatment of lawyering, and
its presentation of theory and the nature of contract law.1
we need another casebook on contracts?" Id. at ix.
5. Two notable recent additions are STEWART MACAULAY, ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW
IN ACTION (1995) and RANDY BARNETT, CONTRACTS, CASES AND DOCTRINES (1995).
6. As of June 1996, CRO was in use at only twenty law schools. Telephone Interview with
West Publishing (Jan. 23, 1997).
7. ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED
OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE (1996).
8. CRO was first published in 1987. So far as I am aware, it has never been reviewed.
9. The reader has more than usual reason to apply the sales warranty metaphor to CRO:
Professor Summers is co-author of the definitive treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code:
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (4th ed. 1995), while
Professor Hillman is co-author of the leading work on the relationship between the Uniform
Commercial Code and the common law: ROBERT A. HILLMAN, ET AL., COMMON LAW AND
EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1985).
10. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at x-xi.
11. I will briefly address the three omitted goals:
(1) Private sources of law and legal administration. Aside from references in some
introductory materials and the review of White v. Benkowski, 155 N.W.2d 74 (Wisc. 1967),
discussed in the text, CRO does not particularly emphasize the "privateness" of contract law, but
its authors must assume that such emphasis would be superfluous. The problems posed to the
students demonstrate that an attorney will have many decisions to make concerning both the
creation and administration of transactional legal relationships. Implicit in these exercises is the
role of private parties in lawmaking and changing. A particularly interesting chapter concerns the
"non-judicial administration of contract law," as it follows a landlord-tenant dispute, memorialized
in a series of letters between the contending parties. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 510-
16. I supplement the course with RICHARD DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN
CONTRACT LAW (1978), which demonstrates the ways in which many "non-legal" factors affect
legal outcomes.
Despite its focus on private sources of law, CRO gives little attention to the limitations on
the power of contract parties to modify statutory and common-law duties. The potential for"contractualization" of tort law, corporate law, and the law of domestic relations has created issues
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I. CRO's LAWYER-CENTERED PEDAGOGICAL APPROACH
A. Emphasis on Lawyering
A major benefit to those of us who give a central place in the first
year curriculum to legal professionalism is CRO's continuous emphasis
on the "lawyer's role" in the contract process. This emphasis begins
in CRO's opening description of the genesis of an appellate opinion.
Using a well known case on punitive damages, White v. Benkowski,12
CRO gives a narrative account of the parties' initial transaction, a copy
of the written contract, a narrative of the events culminating in the
breakdown of the relationship, copies of the initial pleadings and
motions, a summary of some of the trial testimony, the special verdict
form, the judge's ruling on a post-trial motion, the judgment, and
of growing political importance. A comprehensive introduction to contract law should address
the appropriate limitations on individual capacity to alter public regulations by agreement.
Moreover, these questions raise some of the most interesting problems, including the issue of
commodification and inalienability, see Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1849 (1987), the limits of private lawmaking in redefining the family, see Kellye Testy,
An Unlikely Resurrection, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 219 (1995), and the contractual regulation of
information in which the public has an interest.
(2) Dialectical teaching. This was the only pedagogical goal about which I had reservations.
Happily, it seems not to have prevented the authors either from editing the principal cases where
warranted, or from providing squibs or even one-line quotations from minor ones. CRO is replete
with explanatory introductions and snippets of academic commentary, well-chosen for apt and
concise expressions of theoretical positions. By way of comparison, however, CRO provides less
note material than such works as CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1987), and fewer summarized cases than
JOHN P. DAWSON, ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS (6th ed. 1993). CRO also
omits several first year contract classics such as Allegheny College v. National Chautaugua
County Bank of Jamestown, 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927), Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., 1
Q.B. 256 (C.A. 1892), Decicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917), Frigaliment Importing
Co. v. B.N.S. Intern. Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), Lumley v. Guy, 118 Eng.
Rep. 749 (1853), and Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. App.
1965).
(3) Extra-Legal Sources of Law. Lon Fuller insisted that "law" arose from numerous "forms
of social order, such as legislation, adjudication, mediation, markets, contracts, elections, and
managerial direction." Robert S. Summers, Professor Fuller'sJuisprudence and America's Dominant
Philosophy of Law, 92 HARV. L. REV. 433, 444 (1978) [hereinafter Summers, Professor Fuller's
Jurisprudence]. Each of these forms has its own competencies and limitations. See Lon L. Fuller,
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). This insight anticipated
much modem thinking on such issues as whether problems of product safety are best resolved by
markets, legislatures, or courts. Following Fuller's lead, the authors of CRO emphasize the
multiple sources of legal reasoning at several points. See, e.g., SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note
7 at app. a (judicial Reasons); id. at app. b (Historical Background of Consideration and Related
Doctrines). The very nature of the casebook format, however, prevents any actual display of such
forces at work in determining law except insofar as they can be translated into either judicial or
academic reasoning.
12. 155 N.W.2d 74 (Wisc. 1967).
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finally, the appellate opinion.13 This introduction highlights the
involvement of lawyers throughout the contract process by describing
and evaluating the services performed by the parties' counsel at each
step in the dispute. 14
Most other casebooks seem oblivious to the importance of a law
student's early development of a self-image as a professional.t"
Instead, they seem to encourage the student to develop a self-image as,
well, a student, i.e., an innocent inquirer, an earnest compiler and
summarizer, an intellectual answerer of abstract questions, and a
detached critic of practices and theories. By contrast, CRO's questions
and problems repeatedly situate the first year law student in the role
of an attorney whose client has a vital interest in the issue in question.
I believe that this shift in perspective is critical to the professional
development of law students, and leads them to ask themselves a
lawyer's questions: Would I advise my client to sue in these circum-
stances?16 How would I draft a contract so as to achieve or avoid this
result?17 What course of action would I counsel my client to follow
in light of this precedent?18 How can I prove that element of the
claim? 9  Is this settlement offer reasonable?2  'What additional
information do I need to advise my client?2 Is what I am thinking
about doing ethical?2
Ironically, I suspect that those inclined to dismiss this as a trade
school approach are the ones most likely to overlook the critical
13. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 5-26.
14. These include the attorney's role in planning, negotiating, and drafting contracts;
interviewing and advising clients to such transactions; advising clients during the performance
phase; negotiation of disputes; and conducting the litigation of lawsuits arising from breach. I
usually suggest to students that the attorneys may not have served their clients well in several
respects, not the least of which is that the parties managed to litigate the case through the
Wisconsin Supreme Court for an award of 25 cents.
15. There are exceptions to this generalization, including ARTHUR ROSETr, CONTRACT
LAW AND ITS APPLICATION (5th ed. 1994); DAVID H. VERNON, CONTRACTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE (1991); and KNAPP & CRYSTAL, supra note 11.
16. See, e.g., SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 723 (Problem 6-5).
17. See, e.g., SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 371 (Problem 4-1); id. at 373
(Problem 4-2); id. at 379 (Problem 4-3); id. at 426 (Problem 4-10).
18. See, e.g., SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 364 (excerpt from MacNeil, A Primer
of Contract Planning, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 627, 641 n.31 (1975)); see also SUMMERS & HILLMAN,
supra note 7, at 371 (Problem 4-1).
19. See, e.g., SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 723 (Problem 6-5).
20. See, e.g., id. at 334 (Problem 3-15).
21. See, e.g., id. at 371 (Problem 4-1).
22. See, e.g., SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 398 (excerpt from Opinion No. 79
Legal Ethics Committee Opinion 169, Committee on Legal Ethics, District of Columbia Bar
(1980)).
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importance of such inquiries to the validity of more global or objective
conclusions such as "What is the best rule for this situation?" or "How
can contract law reach just results?" When a student is led to think
like a lawyer whose clients want to achieve private ends rather than the
public good, she is apt to make more sophisticated predictions of the
likely consequences of well intended regulation or precedent. To wit,
if all the seller must do to avoid a finding of unconscionability is to
enlarge the font from six point type to fourteen point type and have
the buyer initial the oppressive provision, the unconscionability
precedent will have little effect on the collective well-being of
improvident buyers. 3 An accurate understanding of legal practices
is as essential to legal theory as vice is to versa.
B. Sequence of Topics
The fundamental unit of analysis used by CRO is the "general
theory of obligation," which the authors define as "a recognized basis
for imposing legal duties."24 Before beginning its survey of theories
of obligation, CRO briefly introduces the idea of remedies with the
well-known case of Sullivan v. O'Connor.25 Sullivan is followed by
a quotation from a 1938 letter from Lon Fuller to Karl Llewellyn,
concerning the influence of Fuller's seminal work, The Reliance Interest
in Contract Damages. 6
To me it seems clear that no analysis of contract law can be realistic
or adequate which does not recognize that there exists a hierarchy
of contract interests, which may be sloganized by saying that they
extend from restitution through the reliance interest to the expecta-
tion interest, with a number of little midstations, disturbing to
elegantia juris, along the way... I consider the contribution made
23. Six point seems to be the font of preference for overreaching business merchants. See,
e.g., Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); C&J Fertilizer, Inc., v.
Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra
note 7, at 618 (both courts noting that the unconscionable provisions appeared in six point type).
In treating standardized agreements and unconscionability, CRO often asks students how they
might re-draft the agreement, citing Llewellyn's observation that commercial drafters will "recur
to the attack" when courts invalidate their contractual terms. See Karl N. Llewellyn, 0.
Prausnitz, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and Continental Law, 52 HARV.
L. REV. 700, 702-03 (1939) (book review), excerpted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at
616-17. Awareness of this predictable response is the beginning of enlightenment in thinking
about the regulation of unfair contract practices. Thinking like a lawyer with a regulated client
thus improves one's ability to think like a judge or legislator aiming to regulate that client.
24. See SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 2, 33.
25. 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 35.
26. Lon. L. Fuller and William Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt.1),
46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
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in my article on the reliance interest to lie, not in calling attention
to the reliance interest itself, but in an analysis which breaks down
the contract-no contract dichotomy, and substitutes an ascending
scale of enforceability.27
The "ascending scale of enforceability" is illustrated by the
ensuing comparative survey of seven theories of obligation (bargain
contract with consideration,28 promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment,
promissory restitution,29 tort liability arising from contractual rela-
tions, obligation arising solely from legal form (such as the seal), and
obligation arising from statutory (Article 2) warranties)." The effect
of this survey is to de-center bargain contract from its usually
privileged position in a contracts course and to induce students to think
of civil obligation as a general domain whose provinces include
contract, tort, and property.
27. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 41.
28. The authors have chosen particularly apt cases for the consideration doctrine that lend
themselves very well to the development of the skill of analogical reasoning. For the first three
weeks, literally every new case can be usefully compared to all the preceding ones in classic
fashion, permitting the students to draw ever-finer distinctions and comparisons. The sequence
of principal includes Hardesty v. Smith, 3 Ind. 39 (Ind. 1851), reprinted in SUMMERS &
HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 47; Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94 (N.Y. 1919), reprinted in
SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 48; Maughs v. Porter, 161 S.E. 242 (Va. 1931), reprinted
in SUMMERS & HILLMAN supra note 7, at 55; Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891),
reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 57; Baehr E.I. v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Co., 104
N.W.2d 661 (Minn. 1960), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 60; Springstead
v. Nees, 109 N.Y.S. 148 (N.Y. 1908), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN supra note 7, at 63; De
Los Santos v. Great Western Sugar Co., 348 N.W.2d 842 (Neb. 1984), reprinted in SUMMERS &
HILLMAN supra note 7, at 71; Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917),
reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 73; Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443
N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 75; and Mattei v.
Hopper, 330 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1958), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 77.
29. "Promissory restitution" is the term I prefer. This source of liability is usually referred
to as moral obligation or promises to pay for benefits received.
30. I confess to having exercised the typical professional prerogative by tinkering with
CRO's organization. In the first eight weeks, for example, I violate the casebook sequence by
inserting two lengthy, out-of-order "digressions." First, I teach third-party beneficiary, agency,
assignment, and delegation immediately after the material on bargain contract, promissory
estoppel, and restitution. I find that the third-party material clarifies several references in the
early cases to assignment and agency and demonstrates the way in which performance and
nonperformance can entail externalities that the law should consider. It also prepares students to
consider third-party issues in the later theories of obligation, and prepares them for related topics
in property law, such as assumption of mortgages.
Second, before dealing with warranty doctrine, I use the mistake and fraud materials to
introduce information-based legal obligations and risk allocation. The doctrines of mistake, fraud,
concealment, and warranty form a duster of closely related ideas that are often found together in
any case that appears at first to involve any one of them. I believe that both these digressions
supplement the "compare and contrast" pedagogical strategy of the casebook's introductory
chapter.
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I find that this survey section of CRO "teaches" very well. The"compare and contrast" strategy of presenting several bases of civil
obligation in succession encourages the student to identify the salient
characteristics of each theory and to compare their underlying policies.
This perspective is also eminently practical. Any experienced litigator
knows that disputes arising from commercial transactions usually
engender complaints with multiple counts, each casting the events into
a differently-nuanced retelling, appealing to a different source of
justice, seeking a remedy tailored to its own rationale. Students of
CRO learn early on to look for alternative ways of analyzing transac-
tions.
The comparison approach also yields another dividend, which can
be expressed by the following metaphor. Imagine that the theories of
obligation are arrayed along the vertical axis of a grid and the
associated legal doctrines are arrayed along the horizontal axis. To
determine whether a doctrine applied to a theory, one would trace a
line across from a theory to its points of intersection with the doctrinal
columns. Thus, the line representing the theory of bargain contract
would intersect the columns representing the doctrine of the statute of
frauds, the parol evidence rule and the foreseeability requirement in
damages. CRO's comparison approach leads students to ask whether
these columns might also intersect lines representing other theories of
obligation, such as promissory estoppel or tort arising from contract.
Sometimes this method locates a possible doctrinal application that has
not yet been identified in the caselaw.31 Does the mitigation doctrine
apply to Section 90 claims? Does the contracts foreseeability rule apply
to claims based on torts that arise from contracts? Does the statute of
frauds apply to promises to pay for benefits already received? Does
the mistake doctrine apply to Section 90 promises? CRO recognizes
and encourages such useful speculations.32
My major criticism of this survey is its incompleteness.33 The
most important omission is the theory of obligation that might be
known as "representational obligation," as it is enforced by the tort
31. I was led to the discovery of this phenomenon by several intriguing student questions
about the application of doctrines to different theories. I realized that they were asking these
questions, in part, because of the way the material had been presented.
32. See, e.g., SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 122 (Relation of quasi-contract to
statute of frauds); id. at 156-58, 162-64, 176 (Relation of tort to contract); id. at 206 (Problem 2-
9) (Application of the statute of frauds to other theories of obligation).
33. An additional minor criticism must attend the confusing inclusion in this survey of a
section on the statute of frauds, which is not a theory of obligation. The authors seek, however,
to suggest the application of such formal requirements to noncontractual forms of obligation. See
SUMMERS & HILLMAN supra note 7, at 206.
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doctrines of fraud and misrepresentation. The legal obligation that
arises when one makes a factual representation is quite similar to that
which gives rise to promissory estoppel and often arises in similar
circumstances.34 Just as foreseeable reliance on gratuitous promises
can lead to remedies under Section 90, justifiable reliance on gratuitous
factual representations can lead to remedies in tort. The "beneficial
reliance" rationale that supports enforcement of gratuitous promises
applies with similar force to gratuitous factual representations.35
This omission is not, of course, unique to this casebook. No
contracts casebook gives adequate attention to factual representation as
a basis of legal obligation. Considering the frequency with which
counts of fraud are joined to counts of promissory liability in the world
of civil litigation, this anomaly can be explained only by a stubborn
adherence to the traditional academic boundary between contract and
tort.
Another set of omissions from the survey of theories of obligation
results from CRO's stress on the importance of private-made law, and
its consequent de-emphasis on the public regulation of contractual
exchange. The survey omits the large body of legal relations that are
voluntarily entered, and are often the subject of contractual agreement,
but whose content is defined by public norms that cannot be easily
modified. Examples include the attorney-client relationship and the
relationships arising from marriage, adoption, the formal trust,
partnership, bailment, and agency. A general survey of the civil
obligations that are "related" to contract should include such consent-
based, regulated relationships.3 6
The "ascending scale" theme continues in the remedies section,
which follows the survey of theories of obligation. CRO is one of the
great family of casebooks, tracing their lineage to the patriarchal Lon
Fuller, that discuss remedies before contract formation.37 But by
deferring its treatment of remedies until after it has presented the
theories of obligation, CRO permits remedial doctrines to be evaluated
34. Randy Barnett and Mary Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract
Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443 (1987).
35. For example, a representation of fact can induce beneficial reliance by a person who can
thereby avoid the costs of ascertaining the true state of events, and thus increase social utility or
wealth.
36. Professor Hillman has acknowledged the importance of this debate over state control
of the contracting process in contemporary contract theory, but appears to contend that it could
be resolved only by a unified theory of contract, which he rejects as unrealistic. Robert A.
Hillman, The Crisis in Modem Contract Theory, 67 TEx. L. REV. 103, 123 (1988) [hereinafter
Hillman, Crisis in Contract Theory].
37. Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 1436-37.
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in light of the policies underlying the associated theories. The authors
may have preferred this sequence for jurisprudential as well as
pedagogical reasons. The remedies-first approach might have been
thought to imply a form of legal positivism, criticized elsewhere by
Professor Summers, that equates the concept of having a legal
obligation with the concept of being subject to a legal sanction.3"
Though Fuller would have rejected this form of positivism, he did
contend that legal remedies have a constitutive role in shaping the ends
that law seeks to achieve, and are not merely instruments designed to
achieve a predetermined goal, such as economic efficiency.39 Fuller
argued that the means available to law actually determine the ends that
law can and should rationally seek, and that laws themselves are"means-goal complexes."40  While CRO does not explicitly adopt
Fuller's deconstructive inversion of the traditional relation between
ends and means, it does seek to tie remedies tightly to their underlying
theories of obligation. Less obviously, the remedies section also
reinforces the unstated premise that CRO is concerned solely with
forms of legal obligation that are enforceable by private claims for
damages or equitable relief, and not with promise-based obligation that
would lead to enforcement by state agencies or criminal prosecution.41
The remedies section would benefit in places from more use of
economic reasoning to justify different measures of damages. Whether
one views a legal obligation as an expression of social morality or as
method of social engineering in the instrumentalist mode, the question
of the correct measure of damages for its breach cannot be answered
solely by looking at its theoretical justification. The continuing quest
for the appropriate measure of damages for a claim of promissory
estoppel is but one example of this problem.42
The focus on remedial choice extends to one of the more
impressive later chapters, concerning the appropriate allocation of
losses and gains following the application of the doctrines of impossi-
38. Robert S. Summers, The New Analytical Jurists, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 861, 879 (1966).
39. Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence, supra note 11, at 438. Law, or an economic
system, does not simply serve to satisfy wants, but has a role in forming them. Id. at 439.
40. Id. at 438.
41. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (affirming sentence of life imprisonment
under habitual offender statute for obtaining money under false pretenses: defendant failed to
repair an air conditioner after receiving payment of $120.75 to do so).
42. Compare Daniel Farber & John Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law
and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903 (1985) (expectation damages is appropriate
because promissory estoppel is a contract doctrine) with Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel
and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 378-79 (1969) (remedy depends on whether
estoppel or contract is the theoretical basis for Section 90).
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bility, impracticability, and frustration.43 Again, economic theory
might have served in areas in which natural law seems to offer little
basis for allocation.
After the survey of theories of obligation and remedies, the major
divisions of the casebook correspond to different processes in the
typical chronology of contract behavior." Each chapter begins with
a brief essay on the lawyer's role in relation to that part of the contract
process. After the cases are presented, problems pose lawyering issues
arising from the doctrines and principles.
CRO tries to expose the student to several facets of a transactional
lawyer's services.4" This effort is a much-needed counterbalance to
the dominant image of the lawyer-as-litigator that emerges from an
exclusive diet of appellate case study. If one wishes, one can easily
divide CRO into two halves roughly corresponding to different lawyer
roles. The first half (including theories of obligation and remedies)
tends to emphasize the lawyer as litigator. These materials lend
themselves to discussions of such things as litigation strategies and
judicial rhetoric. The second half emphasizes the lawyer as contract
planner and drafter46 and includes chapters on contract formation,
interpretation, policing doctrines, and conditions. Discussion in the
second semester naturally shifts to matters such as risk allocation and
business planning.
CRO's caselaw coverage in three of these areas---contract
interpretation, the parol evidence rule, and the law of condi-
tions-deserves special mention as being thorough and well thought
out. None of these sections creates any illusion of doctrinal consisten-
cy and the cases are good springboards for discussions of both
lawyering and policy issues. The commentary, especially in the
conditions material, focuses on the lawyer's role in structuring legal
relationships by using these legal doctrines. The authors emphasize
not only the risk-allocating function of express conditions, but also the
numerous ways that courts have developed to avoid the effects of
43. See SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 987-1013.
44. The agreement process (contract formation and policing doctrines); the performance
process (parol evidence rule, interpretation, good faith, conditions); and the cessation process
(impossibility, impracticability, frustration, and their consequences).
45. It gives little attention, however, to the skills of interviewing, negotiating, and
developing proof of material facts.
46. SUMMERs & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 364-84. This break is marked with material
on contract planning and drafting.
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nonoccurrence.47 These cases are well-adapted to teaching perfor-
mance counseling.
II. CRO AND LEGAL THEORY: FIDELITY TO LON
As its authors acknowledge, if CRO can be said to have a
theoretical orientation, it is the jurisprudence of Lon L. Fuller.4"
Fuller's thought anticipated many of the insights of legal process
theory,49 law and economics, ° and relational contract theory.51
47. Thus, after presenting the orthodox doctrine that express conditions must be strictly
satisfied in order for performance of the conditional promise to become due, see, e.g., Brown-Marx
Assoc., Ltd. v. Emigrant Savings Bank, 703 F.2d 1361 (11th Cir. 1983), reprinted in SUMMERS
& HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 769, the authors perforate the doctrine with illustrations of the
following limitations or exceptions: Interpretation of contract language as a covenant rather than
a condition, see, e.g., Howard v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 540 F.2d 695 (4th Cir. 1976), reprinted
in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 776; finding waiver of a nonmaterial express condition,
see, e.g., Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Fox, 361 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1966), reprinted in SUMMERS
& HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 795; Clark v. West, 86 N.E. 1 (N.Y. 1908), reprinted in SUMMERS
& HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 799; finding estoppel to assert a nonoccurrence caused or induced
by the promissor, see, e.g., Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Schlottman, 218, 353 (2d Cir.
1914), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 790, or resulting from the promissor's
failure to exercise necessary diligence in bringing about the occurrence, see, e.g., Luttinger v.
Rosen, 316 A.2d 757 (Conn. 1972), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 788;
overriding express conditions to avoid a forfeiture, either by reading the condition out of the
contract, see, e.g., Foundation Dev. Corp. v. Loehmann's, Inc., 788 P.2d 1189 (Ariz. 1990),
reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 812, or by excusing trivial nonoccurrences
either under equitable powers, see, e.g., J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., 366
N.E.2d 1313 (N.Y. 1977), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 804, or pursuant
to nonforfeiture statutes, see, e.g., Holiday Inns of America, Inc. v. Knight, 450 P.2d 42 (Cal.
1969), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 816; subjecting nonoccurring
conditions of personal satisfaction to an objective test where appropriate or limiting the judging
party's discretion by a standard of good faith, see, e.g., Forman v. Benson, 446 N.E.2d 535 (Ill.
1983), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 782, or fraud, see, e.g., Rizzolo v.
Poysher, 99 A. 390 (N.J. 1916), excerpted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 788;
declaring a condition to be "manifestly unreasonable" or unconscionable, see, e.g., Q. Vandenberg
& Sons v. Siter, 204 A.2d 494 (Pa. 1964), excerpted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at
804.
48. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at x. Professor Summers' assessment of the
thought of Lon Fuller appears to have undergone a significant evolution. Identifying himself with
the analytic or positivist school ofjurisprudence associated with H.L.A. Hart, Summers sided with
Hart in his long-running debate with Fuller over the nature of law. Robert S. Summers, Professor
Fuller on Morality and Law, 18 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1965) (book review). Fuller naturally took
issue with Summers' criticism of his views. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 190-
1, 196-97 (Rev. ed. 1969) (hereinafter FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW]. After Fuller's death,
Summers published a book on Fuller's jurisprudence described by its author as "a sympathetic
general introduction to Fuller's work." See ROBERT S. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER 1 (1984).
49. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process,
107 HARV. L. REv. 2031, 2040 (1994); Anthony J. Sebok, Reading The Legal Process, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 1571, 1575 (1996) (reviewing HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994) (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, eds. 1994) (The Legal Process "adopts and defends Lon
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Although his opposition to legal positivism 2 led many to identify
Fuller with the school of natural law, his legal philosophy was original
and difficult to classify. Fuller espoused a procedural rather than
substantive natural law, whereby a legal order exhibits an "inner
morality" insofar as it achieves the formal characteristics essential to its
efficacious operation." He implied that a legal order's procedural
morality would in some way assure its substantive morality.5 4
Disputing legal positivism's focus on the "top-down" nature of state
coercion, Fuller argued that our legal order is built from "bottom-to-
top" in its customary, contractual, and other consensual forms.55 In
its emphasis on private lawmaking, CRO bears the imprint of Fuller's
influence.
A. The Multidimensional Theory of Obligation
In the preface to CRO, Summers and Hillman promised to deliver
a "multidimensional, general theory of obligation."56 This warranty
should have been disclaimed, however, or at least qualified. Anyone
hoping for a unified field theory of civil obligation must seek it
elsewhere. As with most contracts casebooks, CRO's emphasis on the
Fuller's conception of adjudication."))
50. Fuller and Perdue's Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, supra note 26, is commonly
cited in law-and-economics analysis of contract remedies. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz and Robert
E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1291
(1980).
51. Fuller emphasized the role of the parties themselves in creating and administering legal
order. See Lon L. Fuller, Professional Responsibility, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1161-62 (1959), reprinted
in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 4; LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF
93-5 (1940), cited in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 754.
52. Fuller's most famous attack on legal positivism occurred in the well-known "Hart-
Fuller" debate. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958) [hereinafter Fuller, Fidelity to Law]. Fuller's views on the relationship
between law and morality were also the subject of a lengthy exchange with philosopher Ernest
Nagel on the relationship between fact and value. See Lon L. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural
Law, 3 NAT. L. FORUM 68 (1958); Ernest Nagel, On the Fusion of Fact and Value: A Reply to
Professor Fuller, 3 NAT. L. FORUM 76 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, 3
NAT. L. FORUM 83 (1958); Ernest Nagel, Fact, Value and Human Purpose, 4 NAT. L. FORUM
27 (1959). These articles are anthologized in MAURICE R. COHEN, COHEN AND COHEN'S
READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 596-640 (Philip Suchman Ed., 2d ed.
1979).
53. See FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 48.
54. Fuller argued that a legal system that observed the inner morality of law would have
difficulty implementing irrational laws, such as those enforcing racial apartheid. Id. at 159-62.
This was not one of his most compelling arguments.
55. Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence, supra note 11, at 445-47.
56. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at xi.
Contract and Obligation
multiple policies underlying civil obligation coincides with a refusal to
adopt any single, reductive ur-theory, such as economic efficiency, with
which to rationalize them all.57 And as with most contracts case-
books, this refusal is both a strength and a weakness. While this
approach more easily accommodates the separate historical strands and
different social purposes of each theory of obligation, it offers no hope
of rationalizing these different principles with each other or establishing
authoritative ways of deciding cases when the principles come into
conflict.
A few contemporary theorists have attempted to resolve the bloom
and buzz of doctrine by comprehensive theories of contract obligation.
Randy Barnett's recently published Contracts, Cases and Doctrine"8
attempts to reconcile all contract obligation according to the principle
of consent. Some law and economics advocates would also make such
a claim for the principle of economic efficiency. 9 Acknowledging
somewhat more multiplicity, Steven Burton pursues the Langdellian
dream by organizing his casebook around five general principles: The
Autonomy Principle, The Justification Principle, The Justice Principle,
The Compensation Principle, and The Security Principle. 60
CRO eschews this unifying urge for a pluralistic survey of
doctrine as it finds it. Its message is that there is no overarching
theory, only several social policies and principles that are realized in
the various rules of law. As Professor Hillman expressed it elsewhere:
The institution of contract includes irreconcilable ideas and
discordant phenomena. Fragmented by special rules applying to
distinct kinds of contracts, and subject to various exceptions within
the main body of doctrine and to competing, distinct theories of
obligation, contract law does not fit neatly into any one slot. A
highly abstract core theory simply cannot exercise dominion over the
entire field. Theorizing that denies the need for reconciliation of
conflicting ideas and ideals is thus itself an assault on contract
law.61
In other hands, such observations might launch a critical theory
of contract law. The conflict among contract principles was openly
celebrated in the contracts casebook that inspired the Critical Legal
57. This rejection appears more fully in Hillman, Crisis in Contract Theory, supra note 36,
at 118. "Our complex society is replete with conflicting and evolving ideas, policies, goals, and
methods. It is not surprising that our law reflects these conflicts." Id. at 109.
58. RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS, CASES AND DOCTRINE (1995).
59. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992).
60. STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW v-vii (1995).
61. Hillman, Crisis in Contract Theory, supra note 36, at 123.
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Studies movement, Kessler and Sharp's (and later Gilmore's and later
Kronman's) Contracts: Cases and Materials.6 2  It begins famously
with a section subtitled "Rule and Counterrule," a sequence of paired
cases designed to impress upon the first-year law student that the
principles of contract law are hopelessly contradictory.63 The anti-
authoritarian students of the 60s were liberated by an expos6 of
society's irresolvable moral tensions; the post-everything students of
the 90s are more apt to be demoralized by the insight. While
Summers and Hillman reject grand, totalizing theories like economic
efficiency as inaccurate or incomplete,64 they do not share Kessler,
Sharp, and Gilmore's irreverent glee in exposing the conflict and
incommensurability among the bases of the several theories of
obligation, and more deeply, among the animating principles of
contract law. As a result, CRO seems at times to be a sort of
Agnostic's Bible, bearing witness to the frequent conflicts among
contract principles, urging students to search for principled resolutions,
yet suspending judgment as a matter of principle.
For example, in a squibbed case, Elvin Associates v. Franklin,65
Aretha Franklin was sued for failure to honor a singing engagement to
which she had made an oral commitment. Even though the parties
had exchanged documents stating that neither party would be bound
until execution of a formal contract, the court found Franklin liable
under the theory of promissory estoppel because plaintiff had relied on
her repeated oral assurances that she would perform. Lacking any
more general theory, such as economic efficiency or consent, the basic
theories of obligation made this case undecidable: A denial of recovery
would satisfy the theory of bargain contract (by respecting the
promisor's power to withhold consent to be legally bound) while the
actual outcome satisfies the theory of promissory estoppel (by
protecting the promisee's foreseeable reliance).66 While the grab-bag
62. FRIEDRICH KESSLER & MALCOLM PITMAN SHARP, CONTRACTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1953). The current edition is FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES
AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1986).
63. KESSLER & SHARP, supra note 62, at 55. Those who doubt that casebook authors can
influence theory might note that Duncan Kennedy's early writings on legal indeterminacy can be
seen as an extended elaboration on this casebook's organization. Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1686-87, 1700 (1976). See also
Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985) (using
Kessler & Gilmore's cases to illustrate law's irreconcilable tensions).
64. See Hillman, Crisis in Contract Theoy, supra note 36, at 122.
65. 735 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7,
at 104.
66. See Hillman, Crisis in Contract Theory, supra note 36, at 116-17 (acknowledging the
conflict). It should be noted in passing, however, that Barnett's consent theory fares no better in
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theory gives the student a variety of potential legal analyses from which
to choose, it leaves her without any way of resolving conflicts among
them. Agnosticism thus serves a practitioner better than it does a
judge.
CRO's lack of a general theory of contract also hampers analysis
of the conflicts among such subsidiary doctrines of contract formation
as the parol evidence rule. For example, the authors reprint Harrison
v. Fred S. James, P.A., Inc.,67 in which plaintiff claimed he was
wrongfully discharged from an oral agreement of two years employ-
ment. Shortly after being hired, he executed a written agreement
providing that he could be terminated upon fifteen days written notice.
Finding this document to be an integrated contract, the court held that
the parol evidence rule barred it from considering plaintiffs argument
that the written agreement modified a prior oral contract and was
unenforceable because it was not supported by fresh consideration.
Once again, isolated doctrines and principles made the case undecid-
able: The pre-existing duty rule would make the written contract
modification of a prior oral agreement unenforceable while the parol
evidence rule permits the prior oral agreement to be discharged by the
writing and prohibits inquiry into the new contract's own lack of fresh
consideration. It is apparent that, as a practical matter, either of these
rules would gobble up the other if given unqualified priority in such
conflicts.68
CRO next presents Kinn v. Coast Catamaran Corp.,69 which
holds that the parol evidence rule bars any consideration of prior oral
communications that might establish a promissory estoppel claim
arising before execution of the integration. While in this case, the
parol evidence rule permits bargain contract to displace promissory
estoppel, nothing inherent in either theory of obligation requires this
resolving this case unless it can first adjudicate the legal meaning of the defendant's inconsistent
expressions of consent to be bound. Id. See generally Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractari-
anism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697 (1990) (extensive
supplementation of libertarian consent theory of contract by communal norms of contract
formation and interpretation robs "consent" of its normative power).
67. 558 F. Supp. 438 (E.D. Pa. 1983), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7,
at 690.
68. If the pre-existing duty rule could be overcome by the mere execution of a writing
memorializing the new deal, it would pose no barrier to endless revisions. If the parol evidence
rule fell whenever the proponent of the pre-integration evidence alleged that the integration
modified a prior, inconsistent deal, it would pose no barrier to the parol evidence offered in most
cases.
69. 582 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Wis. 1984), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7,
at 694.
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outcome. CRO draws attention to this conflict in a note7° that
suggests several ways in which the two doctrines might interact.
To resolve such conflicts, a judge or law student needs more than
mere knowledge of the respective policies of each rule. Despite the
authors' claims to propound a "general theory" of civil obligation,
CRO neither provides nor suggests a tertium quid to resolve such
conflicts. CRO's readers must be content to observe the occasional,
spectacular collisions among contract principles much as if they were
nuclear physicists observing events in a particle accelerator, with much
the same hope that the result will reveal some contingent secret about
the inner structure of the atom, or the common law.
CRO dramatizes the conflict among three classic, traditional
theoretical stances in a fictional appellate opinion, Pratt Furniture Co.
v. McBee." Written in the tradition of Fuller's celebrated Case of the
Speluncean Explorers,7" Pratt is a remedies case in which three
appellate judges articulate the positions of conceptualism, economic
efficiency, and what might be called law-and-morality. The latter
judge seems to echo Fuller's approach, and is given the most space
(albeit in dissent).
The Pratt opinion also exemplifies the chilly reception that CRO
gives to economic analysis of law. While such familiar notions as
efficient breach and the economics of nondisclosure are presented, 73
more interesting economic criticism of regulation is not.74 Often the
quoted economic analysis is followed immediately by opinion
70. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 694.
71. Id. at 351-57.
72. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949).
73. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 240-41 (excerpt from RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 89-90 (2d ed. 1977) (efficient breach of contract described));
SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 558 (excerpt from Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake,
Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 18 (1978)). See also
SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 254 (excerpt from Ian Ayers and Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 101-02
(1989)); SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 236 (excerpt from Von Mehren, Contracts in
General, 7 INT'L ENCY. COMP. L. ch. 1 at 89 (1982) (economic efficiency of the expectation
measure of damages for breach of contract)); SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 213-14
(excerpt from David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV.
373, 392-95 (1990) (describing, inter alia, a promise-breaker's guilt as a "sacrifice of psychic and
social goods")).
74. For example, given the extensive limitations on freedom of contract in the name of
regulation, it would seem that the first year is not too soon to introduce students to the possibility
of counterproductivity in instrumentalist law-making. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Paradoxes of the
Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407 (1990).
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disagreeing with it or criticizing it on moral grounds.7" While I think
economics has much to say to contract theory, I personally find this
skepticism healthy. One suspects that the authors' resistance to"positive"76 economic analysis of law may resemble Fuller's antipathy
for legal positivism: "There is indeed no frustration greater than to be
confronted by a theory which purports merely to describe, when it not
only plainly prescribes but owes its special prescriptive powers
precisely to the fact that it disclaims prescriptive intentions."77
B. Missing Critical Theory
CRO contains a wealth of well-chosen and well-edited selections
from theoretical analyses that illuminate the issues raised by the cases.
Conflicting viewpoints are often juxtaposed and the authors are content
to raise questions rather than to resolve them. This theoretical content
is deficient in only one respect: it omits virtually all progressive,
feminist, and critical race theories. The only post-war theories
appearing in CRO's pages are relational contract theory and law-and-
economics analysis, neither of which calls existing contract law
seriously into question. The absence of more critical perspectives
leaves the reader unaware that the traditionalist optimism about the
fundamental rationality and decency of law, and the associated
complacency about its role in facilitating market exchange, may not be
unanimous. These exclusions are even more significant in light of the
authors' concession that contract law consists of irreconcilable ideas
and discordant phenomena,"8 and of Fuller's account of law as a
"bottom-up" construction, inextricably entwined in social and moral
reasoning.79 A body of law that emerges as a witches' brew of
ideology, tradition, reason, commerce, popular culture, religion, racism,
sexism, and faction would seem to stand in special need of critical
75. Thus Posner's articulation of the theory of efficient breach, see supra note 69, is followed
by what appears to be a critical comment by Lon Fuller, see FULLER, MORALITY OF LAW supra
note 48, at 2, reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 241, while Kronman's
economic analysis of the rules of nondisclosure, see supra note 73, is followed by a critical
comment from CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 79, 83 (1981), reprinted in SUMMERS
& HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 558.
76. Oft invoked is MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Econoaics, in ESSAYS
IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3 (1953). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 15-17 (4th ed. 1992).
77. Fuller, Fidelity to Law, supra note 52, at 632.
78. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
79. Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence, supra note 11, at 445-47.
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analysis."0 Despite their hostility to the forms that critical theory has
taken,"' more in the way of theory on race, class, and gender should
be included in the next edition of CRO.
Somewhat disturbingly, Summers and Hillman seem to have made
a special effort to eliminate any reference to race or gender from
materials that would otherwise raise such issues on their own. The
third case in CRO's survey of the consideration doctrine is Maughs v.
Porter," in which plaintiff sought enforcement of an auctioneer's
promise to give persons attending the auction a chance to win a new
car.83 The auctioneer's promise was made in an advertisement, which
is quoted in the opinion. CRO's text of Maughs omits the single word"white" from the advertisement, which had limited the offer to white
persons.8 4 I can only assume that the authors wanted to avoid the
80. I do not mean to imply that CRO should receive critical theory uncritically. Quite the
contrary. For example, the most frequently cited article on feminist theory of contract may be
Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U.
L. REV. 1065 (1985), and its criticism of DAWSON ET AL., supra note 11. Frug attacked
Dawson's casebook for its failure to proffer a feminist interpretation of Parker v. Twentieth-
Century Fox, 474 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970), and thus leading students to infer that Parker was a
stereotypically grasping, indolent female for refusing to accept a substitute movie role when her
original contract role was canceled. Frug argues that Parker rejected the demeaning, sexist role
in the substitute film because it was inferior to the progressive, feminist role she was to have
played in the original movie. Id. at 1116.
In my opinion, however, this celebrated analysis is the least convincing part of Frug's essay.
How can a casebook editor be faulted for failure to mention an argument that was ignored by the
majority of the California Supreme Court, which was obviously straining to find some element
of inferiority in the proffered contract? The most plausible inference is that the court did not
mention it because Parker's attorneys did not argue it, that they did not argue it because she did
not instruct them to, and that she did not instruct them to because she did not refuse the
substitute role for feminist reasons. Whether or not Frug's "re-reading" is wishfully conjectural,
and I believe it is, any such speculation in Dawson's casebook would be presumptuous. Dawson's
editors continue to decline the opportunity in the sixth edition.
Ironically, Frug missed a much better opportunity to make the same point about stereotyping
in Dawson's treatment of Sharon v. Sharon, 8 P. 614 (1885), reprinted in DAWSON ET AL., supva
note 11, at 211 (5th ed.). Sharon holds that a woman gave adequate consideration for a
promissory note by promising not to "annoy or disturb plaintiff in his rooms." Imagine, a woman
having to be paid not to irritate a man! The squib omits that the parties had previously cohabited
illegally and that the note in all likelihood represented a form of quasi-alimony. This squib is
omitted in the sixth edition of Dawson's casebook, so perhaps Frug's critique struck home after
all.
81. See Hillman, Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, supra note 36, at 106-13 (critical legal
studies overstates the indeterminacy of law).
82. 161 S.E. 242 (Va. 1931), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 55.
83. Plaintiff was adjudged to be the winner of the drawing, but the auctioneer refused to
deliver the prize. The court denied recovery, however, because, although the auctioneer's promise
was supported by consideration (the plaintiffs attendance at the auction), the contract was held
to be unenforceable on grounds that it created an illegal lottery under Virginia law. Id.
84. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 55. The reference was included in CRO's first
edition and omitted without any textual sign of deletion from the second edition. The omission
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"distraction" the offending word had introduced into classroom
discussions of the consideration doctrine.
But by eliding evidence of racism in the Virginia residential
housing market of the 1930s, the authors lose a golden opportunity to
make a critical point in connection with their central theme that
contract law is a form of private lawmaking."5 The advertisement can
be the springboard for a discussion of racially restrictive covenants,
demonstrating that private lawmakers can sometimes achieve evils
beyond the constitutional power of public lawmakers.8 6
CRO also omits Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,87 but
gives students the following problem on the standard form contract:
Problem 5-6. Sally Williams comes to your law office and tells
you that during the last five years she purchased over $1,800 worth
of household items from Thomas Appliances for which payments
were to be made in installments. Williams' balance at Thomas
Appliance was now only $164, but she was in default, and could not
pay. Thomas Appliances has just told Williams that it is going to
take back all the items she has purchased from the store, not just the
most recently purchased one which cost more than $164. The terms
of each purchase were contained in a printed form contract. Each
form contained the following clause:
[T]he amount of each periodical installment payment to be
made by purchaser to the Company under this present
agreement shall be inclusive of and not in addition to the
amount of each installment payment to be made by purchaser
under such prior agreements or accounts; and all payments now
and hereafter made by purchaser shall be credited pro rata on
all outstanding agreements and accounts due to the Company
by purchaser at the time each such payment is made.
Ms. Williams was not well-educated; she had completed only
the eighth grade. Before checking your state's consumer protection
legislation, are there any common law approaches to Ms. Williams'
problem? Do you understand the above provision?8
Now this is an interesting approach to the issues presented in
Williams, and I am not at all sure that it merits criticism. It may
is marked by an ellipsis in the third edition. lId.
85. This theme is emphasized at the very beginning of the casebook. See, e.g., SUMMERS
& HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 4-5, 7-8.
86. Judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants ended only with Shelly v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
87. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
88. SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 7, at 626.
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indeed merit praise. The problem forces students to interpret the
obscure provision that bound Ms. Williams. 9 This exercise could
tend to foreclose any tendency to attribute her lack of understanding
(if indeed she failed to understand the clause)90 to her lack of intel-
ligence or education.
The interesting thing about Problem 5-6 is not what it includes,
however, but what it leaves out: all references to race and economic
class, and certain aspects of gender that were so important in Williams.
The authors might argue that omission of any reference to Ms.
Williams's race is intentional and laudable. While most readers of
Williams assume that the plaintiff was African-American and on
welfare,9 this assumption is harmful stereotyping. 92 CRO might
then be more enlightened to eliminate all clues that would support
such a racial stereotype. 93
Few contracts opinions mention race at all, since it does not figure
as a formal element in any contract doctrine. This has led some to
complain that African-Americans are "invisible" in accounts of
89. Summers and Hillman anticipated the exercise recently described in Muriel Morisey
Spence, Teaching Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 3 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L.R. 89,
97 (1994).
90. The lower court opinion states that she testified to an understanding inconsistent with
the legal meaning of the clause, viz. that her payments would be applied to each item until paid
off. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d. 914 (D.C. 1964). The Circuit Court
opinion does not rest on such a finding.
91. The inference from the opinion alone is apparently based on plaintiff's residence in
Washington, D.C. and her receipt of government "relief" benefits. See Spence, supra note 89,
at 94-5. These elements are eliminated in Problem 5-6.
92. See Spence, supra note 89, at 95; Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law:
From the Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L.R. 1 (1995). While Chase says that Williams
is about African-American consumers he nevertheless faults one unnamed contracts casebook
author for saying so. Id. at 38-39.
Stereotyping low income consumers is a concern because the authors of CRO, along with
those of many other contracts casebooks, use Judge Wachtel's opinion in Jones v. Star Credit
Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1969), reprinted in SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note
7, at 601-04. Although it rules in favor of the plaintiffs, the opinion stereotypes welfare recipients
as "uneducated" and "often illiterate." These descriptions apparently were not established by the
evidence, yet were essential to the finding of unconscionabiity.
93. Chase, supra note 92, at 85. Chase argues that to include Williams in contracts
casebooks reinforces negative stereotypes of African-Americans. Id. at 38-39.
For a different, though qualified view on the wisdom of including Williams, see Spence, supra
note 89. Spence uses an exercise designed to teach students not to jump to conclusions about Ms.
Williams's race or economic status from the facts of the opinion. She warns professors to be
cautious about making any reference to her race. Id. at 95, n.32. Yet, she considers Williams to
provide an opportunity to bring in "issues of race" so long as they involve "different perspectives"
and not "stereotypes." Id. at 98. Since it is difficult for me to imagine how to prevent a
discussion of "the African-American perspective" or "the outsider's perspective" from shading
into "stereotypes" of African-Americans or outsiders, her warning would seem well-advised.
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contemporary American contract law.94 When race is mentioned, it
is often implied to be a "disability" justifying judicial paternalism. 9
CRO thus might well justify "de-racializing" Williams. Yet, to
eliminate references to race is to eliminate references to racism.
Race is not the only factor erased by the problem, however.
What of Ms. Williams's economic class? That too seemed relevant to
the opinion in Williams, but the hypothetical is about the use of
standard form contracts with tricky language, and not about unconscio-
nability arising from a lack of bargaining power. The original
plaintiff's receipt of government benefits and the ratio of the purchase
price to the amount of her monthly income thus must have been
thought to be superfluous to the case.
The effort to eliminate the plaintiff's poverty also raises the
question of how it is that Sally Williams has come to "your law
office." What kind of practice do "you" have? Why is it feasible even
to consider litigating such a small claim? The public interest features
of Williams drop out in Problem 5-6, and with them the realistic
rationale for actual litigation.
Problem 5-6 also minimizes some of the aspects of Williams
relating to gender. Both Ms. Williams's status as a single mother and
the number of her children are omitted from the problem. I have
found that when these facts are encountered in classroom discussions
of Williams, someone usually mentions her domestic heroism. Again,
the authors might contend that these details are irrelevant to the
standard form contract issue.
But sanitizing such cases by eliminating "extraneous factors" such
as race, poverty, and gender may alter the fundamental meaning of the
case as a source of law,96 in part by making the seller's behavior less
culpable. Instead of a racist, exploitative, ghetto merchant taking
advantage of someone who was unable to shop elsewhere, who had
little formal education, who was struggling to support her family on
welfare, and whose modest home would be stripped bare by the
94. Chase, supra note 92, at 39. Chase criticizes all contracts casebooks for omitting
reference to African-Americans as parties, attorneys, and judges. Id.
95. Chase, supra note 92, criticizes Knapp and Crystal for including in their casebook St.
Landry Loan Co. v. Avie, 147 So. 2d 725 (La. 1962), which is the only other case he has found
in major contracts casebooks in which the opinion mentions that a party was black, on grounds
that it too features a black person as illiterate and in need of judicial protection. Id. at 56.
96. See Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New
Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1981) (determining
unconscionability in consumer transactions requires consideration of individual factors such as lack
of education, lack of resources to conduct sufficient investigation, inability to obtain reasonable
credit, and psychological needs).
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coercive repossession, Problem 5-6 involves only an appliance store
that snookered a middle class consumer with some tricky contract
language.
And we are left with the question, why does CRO use the facts of
Williams at all? (The names of the parties,97 the amounts of the
indebtedness, etc.) Since the authors omit Williams, the students will
miss these allusions, which are for the sole benefit of the professors 8
Only we insiders are supposed to realize that Williams could have been
analyzed as a case solely about defective information in a standard form
agreement. 99
Apparently, the authors of CRO are uncomfortable with discus-
sions of race, class, and gender in the contracts classroom. So am I.
The casebook does nothing to ameliorate the problem. Given the
paucity of references to these topics in case reports, it becomes even
more important to include theory on the effects of race, economic
status, and gender in the supplemental materials. It may be that the
most a first year course can aspire to is to hint at the possibilities of
critical reaction to law, possibilities that must await an upper level
treatment that can supply sufficient theory to permit full exploration.
I would like to see CRO provide such hints in its next revision.
III. CONCLUSION
CRO provides an excellent beginning to a study of lawyering in
the context of the law of civil obligation. The role of the lawyer in
helping business people structure their legal environments is repeatedly
described, and it is by and large an attractive description. The
authors have achieved an admirable balance between the practical and
theoretical sides of an attorney's world and they repeatedly draw
attention to the ethical implications of attorney conduct. They
97. In Problem 5-6, Summers and Hillman change Ms. Williams's first name from Ora Lee
to Sally. In her handout, Professor Spence changes Ms. Williams' first name to Mary to illustrate
stereotypical reactions to the case. I assume that both authors considered plaintiffs name to
suggest her race.
98. The teacher's manual, but not the casebook, gives the information that Problem 5-6 is
based on Williams.
99. If so, the unreadability of the clause would seem to be less problematic. It is not
expected that consumers actually read and understand standard form agreements, only that their
terms be reasonable and not contradict the dickered terms of the deal and the contract-taker's
reasonable expectations. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (SECOND) § 251 (1981). The
standardized contract term thus need not be any more comprehensible to a consumer, or even a
first-year law student, than a standardized mechanical component buried inside a mass-produced
appliance. It is the substantive fairness of the term in light of Williams's reasonable expectations
that counts.
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communicate a genuine interest in the student's future life as a lawyer
and I think that students appreciate this orientation and are improved
by it.
In the interest of conveying this message, however, the authors of
CRO have de-emphasized both the extent of public, regulatory control
over private contracting and its inherently political nature. As a
practical matter, this omission contributes to what has become the
typical blind spot of first-year law students, who remain largely
unaware of the overwhelming importance of statutory and regulatory
law. Such omissions may be inevitable given the fragmented nature of
the traditional law school curriculum. As a theoretical matter,
however, without a critical perspective, the ideology of contract law
will remain as invisible to the law student as it is to the practitioner.
Perhaps the next edition will remedy this shortcoming in what is
otherwise an excellent teaching vehicle.
